Purdue University

Purdue e-Pubs
Libraries Research Publications

5-1-2000

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board’s First
Decade
Bert Chapman
Purdue University, chapmanb@purdue.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/lib_research
Chapman, Bert, "The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board’s First Decade" (2000). Libraries Research Publications. Paper 70.
http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/lib_research/70

This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for
additional information.

Journal of Government Information 27 (2000) 345-383

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board's First Decade
Bert Chapman

Abstract

Concern over the safety of the United States' defense nuclear reactors in the
late 1980s led to congressional creation of an independent oversight board.
The Defense Nuclear Facility Safeties Board (DNFSB) is responsible for
overseeing safety issues at the U.S. Department of Energy's nuclear facilities
and issuing recommendations on operations and safety at these facilities,
which include South Carolina's Savannah River Site, Texas' Pantex facility,
Colorado's Rocky Flats Depot, and others. This article provides an historical
overview of the DNFSB's first decade and discusses its relationship and
interaction with the Department of Energy and congressional oversight
committees as well as the recommendations it has issued on nuclear safety.
An assessment of DNFSB's future prospects concludes the article.
Keywords: U.S. Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board; Defense nuclear facilities; U.S. Department of
Energy defense programs; Nuclear weapons storage; Environmental policy; Public administration

1. Introduction

Developing a viable nuclear weapons arsenal was an essential component in the U.S.
military victory over Japan during World War 11. Expanding and sustaining the
credibility, quantity, and quality of this nuclear deterrent would also play a critical
role in the United States' protracted, but ultimately triumphant, Cold War
confrontation with the Soviet Union. Creating the technical and physical foundations
of the infrastructure supporting this nuclear weapons development saw the creation of
numerous facilities with diverse responsibilities at various locations nationwide.
These facilities, under the guidance and generally secretive policies of agencies such
as the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE), succeeded in developing and maintaining an effectual American nuclear
deterrent but at the price of significant environmental degradation1.
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This environmental degradation occurred over the past 50 years as DOE and its
predecessor agencies focused on nuclear weapons development, production, and
testing at the expense of environmental safety. A 1994 U.S. government report
provides a contextual assessment of some of the environmental costs of the nuclear
weapons production:
The nuclear weapons complex consists of 15 major facilities and a dozen or so
smaller facilities at which production, research, and testing have occurred over
the past five decades. In addition, DOE is responsible for environmental
cleanup at thousands of sites formerly used in the weapons program and sites
where uranium was processed. Altogether DOE must contend with more than
100 million gallons of highly radioactive waste, 66 million gallons of waste
contaminated with plutonium, and larger volumes of low-level radioactive
waste. It also must deal with huge volumes of other toxic materials, including
heavy metals, chemicals used as solvents, acids, and other materials that are
difficult and costly to clean up2.
The extent of DOE'S nuclear weapons complex is staggering. Its facilities are
dispersed over 13 states covering 3,350 square miles and employ more than 100,000
people. These individuals and facilities have been involved in responsibilities such as
producing uranium materials, irradiating them in nuclear reactors, reprocessing those
materials to separate weapons parts, manufacturing and finishing weapons
components, weapons assembly and testing, researching and designing new weapons,
and recycling parts of retired weapons3.
Specific weapons-related work at these DOE facilities has generally been divided
into four categories. Weapons research and development is performed at New
Mexico's Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories and California's Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory. Production and processing of nuclear materials, such
as plutonium and tritium, occur at the Hanford Plant in Washington and the Savannah
River Site in South Carolina with supplemental uranium processing at Ohio's Feed
Materials Production Center and the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
Warhead component production occurs at Colorado's Rocky Flats Plant, Tennessee's
Y-12 plant at Oak Ridge, Ohio's Mound Plant, Florida's Pinellas Plant, and
Missouri's Kansas City Plant, culminating in final weapons assembly at Texas'
Pantex Plant. Warhead testing at the Nevada Test Site rounds out the nuclear
weapons production cycli.
These weapons-producing complexes are in diverse natural and demographic
settings. The possibility of environmental accidents at some of these sites, coupled
with their proximity to significant population centers, illustrates the need for further
understanding of public concern over operations at these facilities. The Rocky Flats
plant is within 16 miles of downtown Denver, Boulder, and Golden, Colorado, with
80,000 people living within three miles of its facilities. Approximately 140,000
people live in close proximity to the Hanford facility which is also near the Columbia
River and some 360,000 people live in Portland, Oregon, just 230 miles downstream
from Hanford on the Columbia. The Savannah River Site and Tennessee's Oak Ridge
Reservation are located near metropolitan areas such as Aiken, South Carolina,
Augusta, Georgia, and Knoxville, ~ennessee'.

A study of the environmental costs caused by weapons production at the Hanford Site reveals that public concerns over environmental contamination from nuclear weapons production sites has some justification. Findings from this study, garnered from the 1986 release of
DOE documents, demonstrate that radioactive and chemical wastes in billions of gallons, and
over one billion cubic meters of gases were emitted since Hanford's opening in late 19446.
This report also maintained that other consequences of toxic releases fiom Hanford included the following characteristics:
In the hectic months of 1945 alone, 345,000 curies of radioiodine (1-13 1), generated by
the chemical separation of plutonium from the irradiated fuel rods, was released into
the atmosphere. This gas blew down the wind streams ("down-wind") of eastern Washington: to the east, northeast, and south-east. The radioiodine also deposited on vegetation throughout the region where it was available to cows and goats, which produced
milk drunk by humans. . . .
By 1955, eight single-pass (open coolant) nuclear reactors operated continuously at
Hanford, . . . These reactors discharged billions of gallons of cooling water, laden with
fission and activation products, to the river and to the ground. Through the rich aquatic
life in the Columbia, as well as through the insects and waterfowl that bred in and fed
on it, these radioactive wastes entered the food chain. . . . By the late 1950's, underground tanks holding the most toxic, concentrated, and long-lived radionuclides at Hanford had begun to leak into the ground. Sometimes these releases have reached the water table7.
Nuclear waste emitted from these sites has also proven to be a public policy, scientific,
and political problem. Nuclear weapons site clean-up costs are estimated at over $100 billion8.
Highly dangerous wastes temporarily stored near reactor sites must remain isolated from the
biosphere for up to 10,000 years and beyond. Estimates of the total volume of high-level
waste are for 41,000 metric tons by 2000 and nearly 87,000 metric tons by 2020. Public and
political concern over this issue became more prominent during the 1980s with the revelation
of significant chemical and radioactive contamination at DOE weapons plants and laboratories as a result of a historic neglect of health, safety, and environmental issues by DOE and
its predecessor agencies at these facilities9.

2. Major U.S. nuclear legislation
Concern over the environmental consequences of this extensive contamination reached
the attention of federal policymakers during the late 1980s. These individuals drafted, implemented, and enforced legislation to try to assuage public concerns about nuclear waste. It is
instructive to look at major nuclear legislation enacted by the U.S. government prior to creation of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) as a means of gaining historical perspective on federal nuclear policies.
The first major nuclear era statute, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, created the Atomic
Energy Commission (AEC) to promote and regulate the defense and commercial functions of
the emerging nuclear industrylO.The President appointed the AEC's five members for five-

year terms and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy oversaw commission operations. The
AEC placed particular emphasis on maintaining secrecy about nuclear activities given their
national security implications in the aftermath of World War I1 and the emerging Cold War
confrontation with the Soviet Union'l.
In 1954 the Atomic Energy Act was amended and updated". The new legislation opened
the nuclear power industry to the private sector and established procedures for licensing
commercial nuclear power plants. It also gave the United States the authority to enter into cooperative nuclear energy agreements with other nations but provided little concrete guidance
on setting public health and safety standards for nuclear facilities despite the presence of
vague language within the statute on this issue13.
A third significant nuclear law was a 1957 amendment to the 1954 Atomic Energy Act
known as the Price-Anderson ~ c t lThis
~ . legislation made preliminary recognition of the potential dangers to public safety involved in nuclear weapons production by establishing a
$500 million liability h n d as a supplement to an existing $60 million private h n d to compensate nuclear accident victims. Price-Anderson also contained language protecting the nuclear industry against unlimited liability if there were a catastrophic nuclear accidentI5.
Concern over the U.S. vulnerability to the 1973 oil embargo and concern over the dispersed energy-related activities of U.S. government agencies, led to the passage of the Energy Reorganization Act of 197416.This legislation created the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) as a means of centralizing and enhancing the efficiency of
federal energy activities and policies. It also abolished the AEC and replaced it by creating
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which assumed responsibility for regulatory
oversight of commercial nuclear power plants. Administration of defense nuclear facilities
was transferred to ERDA". Further energy policy centralization occurred with the 1977 passage of the Department of Energy Organization Act creating the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE), which assumed responsibility for oversight of defense nuclear facilities".
A final significant nuclear-related statute is the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 198219.The
multiple provisions of this legislation included requiring the DOE to develop a comprehensive national policy for the interim storage and final disposal of commercial high-level radioactive waste, preparing and developing several possible waste storage facility sites within
specified time periods, contracting with utilities to begin accepting waste at repositories on
specified dates, assisting utilities with interim storage efforts through demonstrations of
waste storage technologies, assuring sufficient managerial resources through creation of an
independent single-purpose waste management organization, and incorporating defense
waste into these commercial programs20.
The legal and policy environment of nuclear waste disposal was hrther complicated in the
1980s through courtroom litigation. A particularly noteworthy development in this arena was
an April 13, 1984, federal ruling by the Eastern District Court of Tennessee in the case Legal
Environmental Assistance Foundation, Inc, et. a!. v. Hodepl. A variety of environmental
groups had filed suit against the DOE charging it with violating the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA) provisions covering hazardous waste treatment, storage, transportation, and disposal along with provisions of the Clean Water Act in DOE operations of
its nuclear weapons manufacturing Y-12 plant at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. DOE argued that
RCRA did not apply to Y-12 operations because the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) precluded

-

state regulation of DOE, that the AEA places waste disposal authority with DOE, and that the
AEA restricted dissemination of restricted nuclear weapons and materials data. However,
Judge Robert L. Taylor rejected DOE's arguments, siding with the plaintiffs. Damages were
not awarded in this case due to the national defense elements of Y-12's activities and DOE'S
willingness to reduce environmental damage22.
This ruling, nevertheless, contributed to creating a legal environment more conductive to
litigation against governmental and private sector hazardous waste disposal activities. These
nuclear statutes and further revelations about declining infrastructure and worker safety conditions at defense nuclear plants such as Rocky Flats2', would create sufficient impetus for
the creation of an agency to examine conditions and operations thoroughly at DOE's defense
nuclear facilities.

3. Creating a conducive environment for a defense nuclear agency

A significant factor contributing to the creation of a defense nuclear oversight agency was
the Soviet Union's Chemobyl accident in April 1986 with secondary stimulus provided by
the March 1979 Three Mile Island accident in Pennsylvania. These events provided vivid
demonstrations of the immediate and long-term consequences of a nuclear facilities accident.
Immediate and subsequent evidence compiled on Chemobyl demonstrated that radioactive
fallout from the Chemobyl plant spread to countries as diverse and widespread as Poland,
Sweden, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and Finland24.Longer-term consequences of Chemoby1 include Belarus receiving 70 percent of the accident's radioactive fallout, thyroid cancer
among Belarussian children increasing by 285 times, Belarus devoting 25 percent of its government budget to Chemobyl-related issues, 270 square miles of Ukraine contaminated with
plutonium-239,4.6 million hectares of arable lands and 4.4 million hectares of Ukranian forests contaminated with radioactive residues, and about one million cubic meters of radioactive materials stored in Ukranian burial and temporary disposal sites25.
Additional concern over the safety of U.S. nuclear plants was augmented by a long-standing practice of secrecy by the government and private sector operators of U.S. defense and
civilian nuclear power plants. A 1986 hearing by the House Energy and Commerce Committee's Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power revealed that DOE and NRC officials instructed nuclear safety experts at their agencies to not discuss the Chemobyl accident
with the press and to avoid comparing Chemobyl with U.S. nuclear reactors. The NRC also
asked the subcommittee to keep secret details of accidents at 15 1 nuclear facilities in 14
countries besides the United States and Soviet Union between 197 1 and 198426.
The Chemobyl accident and growing concerns over the possible occurrence of such an accident in the United States, coupled with the emergence of investigative reports on the environmental costs of nuclear plant emissions, would ensure the end of long-standing govemment and private sector secrecy concerning nuclear facility safety. A particularly important
boost to legislative reform initiatives was the publication of a National Research Council report on defense nuclear facilities.
Safety Issues At the Defense Production Reactors: A Report to the U.S. Department of Energy was released in 1987. This report was requested by Secretary of Energy John S. Her-
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rington to provide an independent assessment of Chernobyl's implications for safety at DOE
reactors2'. Reviewers placed particular emphasis on safety and technical issues involving reactors at Savannah River and Hanford. Overall investigation findings revealed that DOE had
relied almost exclusively on private sector contractors to identify safety concerns and propose remedial actions due to the superior expertise held in these areas by contractors instead
of DOE personnel, that DOE's management approach to the mix of production and safety responsibilities fell short of reasonable expectation; that DOE's production reactor safety oversight was internal, not subject to public scrutiny, and vulnerable to DOE budget constraints.
Investigation findings also led to the report's advocacy for an independent external safety
oversight committee to be established to enhance public confidence in the safety of DOE defense production reactors, and that the majority of this committee's work should be unclassified and publicly available. An additional study of DOE operations also revealed that individual DOE contractors developed their own standards and testing methods for hazardous
waste disposal with none of these methods receiving DOE approval2*.
Additional impetus for creation of a defense nuclear agency would also be provided by a
1989 Senate Governmental Affairs Committee study, Early Health Problems of the U.S. Nzrclear Weapons Indztstry and Their Implications For Today. Findings from this report demonstrated that high-level AEC officials were aware of serious public health problems arising
from worker exposure to highly radioactive particles and gases at AEC facilities such as
Hanford between 1947 and 1954. This report also determined that a Centers for Disease Control (CDC) panel learned that the DuPont Company found Savannah River Plant workers experiencing excessive leukemia rates, that Oak Ridge National Laboratory workers faced increased risk of cancer death due to radiation exposures, that cancer deaths of Rocky Flats
workers rose with increasing plutonium exposures, and that DOE's long-standing concern
over legal liability had been an important deterrent affecting its health and safety research29.

4. Creation of DNFSB

These revelations of worker safety and health deficiencies at DOE nuclear facilities, coupled
with public concern over a possible repetition of the Chemobyl accident and the National Research Council report documenting significant weaknesses in DOE defense reactor safety management, created a political climate conducive to the introduction of reform legislation. The 100th
Congress would see the introduction of numerous pieces of DOE nuclear oversight legislation30.
On April 9, 1987, Representative Norman Dicks (D-WA) introduced H.R. 2047 to establish a Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Agency, which was referred to the House Armed
Services and Energy and Commerce Committee3'. H.R. 2047 stressed that the Secretary of
Energy would be required to provide any information requested by this agency. Its administrator would be authorized to hold hearings, conduct depositions, issue subpoenas, and to be
able to suspend operations or construction at new or existing defense nuclear facilities if the
administrator determined public health or safety were not reasonably protected3'.
Senator John Glenn (D-OH) introduced S. 1085, the Senate version of this legislation, on April
23, 1987, as the Nuclear Protections and Safety Act of 198733.Testifying at a subsequent hearing,
Glenn stated that the proposed defense nuclear safety agency would have six primary functions:
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1. Ensuring the implementation of current DOE health and safety standards.
2. Issuing advisory recommendations in the content and application of DOE standards.
3. Investigating events at DOE facilities that the agency considers important due to their
potential or actual adverse impact on public health or safety.
4. Recommending specific measures to prevent the occurrence of such events.
5. Issuing periodic unclassified public reports with its recommendations and the decision
to implement corrective steps at DOE facilities.
6. Making recommendations and being consulted with to ensure that design, construction,
health, and safety standards at DOE facilities are appropriate and comparable to those
standards at comparable private sector nuclear f a ~ i l i t i e s ~ ~ .
The Reagan administration provided a more mixed assessment of this legislation. At a
Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on this legislation, Energy Department Undersecretary Joseph F. Salgado testified that DOE and the public would benefit from establishing
an independent advisory board to oversee nuclear facility safety and emphasized DOE's existing environmental, safety, and health programs as well as its commitment to improving
safety conditions at its nuclear fa~ilities'~.
Salgado went on to maintain, though, that establishing a new oversight agency would create a new and unnecessary regulatory bureaucracy, that the Secretary of Energy would not
have the flexibility to respond to the new agency's recommendations, and neither the Secretary nor the President would be able to exercise their statutory responsibilities over the nation's nuclear weapons program. He also asserted that DOE must be given more authority to
consider whether the cost-effectiveness of recommended changes go beyond essential safety
standards, that the new agency be required to use clearly defined safety goals in its recommendations, and that accountability was achievable through clearer performance standards
and a process inviting public input and informing Congress of planned actions36.
Title I of S. 1085 (the section creating an independent nuclear safety board) was reported by
the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on September 24, 1987, and referred to the Senate
Armed Services Committee3'. This panel expressed concerns about the Governmental Affairs
Committee's report on S. 1085. Armed Services Committee members questioned what they saw
as a lack of clear priorities in the board's mission, the possibility that overly stringent safety standards could be applied by the board, and the considerable powers given the board provided it
"with significant authority but insufficient responsibility for the consequences of its actionsw3'.
Consequently, S. 1085's language was revised during five hearings held by the Senate
Armed Services Committee in late 1987. This panel ultimately produced a report that established an organization with the following modus operandi:
The basic goals in establishing an independent safety oversight board are to assure and
enhance the safety of operations of DOE's nuclear facilities and to restore public confidence that these facilities are operated without undue risk to public safety and health.
The Committee does not believe that a safety board is a panacea for all DOE safety
problems, or that it can in any way absolve the Secretary or the Department's contractors of their fundamental safety responsibilities. In fact, many witnesses testified that
DOE's shortcomings largely reside within the Department's line management, and that
there can be no substitute for capable and committed line management.
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What the Board can do is provide critical expertise, technical vigor, and a sense of vigilance within the Department at all levels. The Board should be instrumental in helping
DOE to develop appropriate and operationally meaninghl safety standards, and in ensuring their translation into clear and consistent requirements for DOE management and contractors. The Board should assist in further developing and broadening facility risk assessments and in measuring those risks against safety standards. With reasonable safety criteria
as an objective basis for evaluation, the Board should also help the Secretary make sound
modernization decisions. Above all, the Board must have a primary mission to identify the
nature and consequences of any significant potential threats to public health and safety, to
elevate such issues to the highest levels of authority, and to inform the public39.
Following these revisions and subsequent negotiations between Congress and the Reagan
administration, S. 1085 was incorporated into the Department of Defense authorization bill
for Fiscal Year 1989. It received final congressional approval from the House and Senate on
September 28, 1988. President Reagan signed the legislation the next daflo.
4.1. Problematic pzrblic opinion on nuclear waste disposal
Numerous political problems confronted the DNFSB as it began setting up operations.
The most important of these was deep public skepticism toward government institutions and
those institutions involved in the disposal of nuclear waste. This skepticism received further
reinforcement from the historically close relationship between DOE and its nuclear plant
contractors, which saw DOE grant these contractors broad exemptions from financial and legal liability, providing significant financial awards to contractor employees at Rocky Flats
despite DOE recognition of serious environmental and safety problems at that site, and DOE
paying for contractor fines and penalties4'.
Additional public displeasure stems from diverging cost estimates for cleaning up DOE'S
nuclear weapons complex. A 1991 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond assessment mentioned divergent DOE and General Accounting Office (GAO) assessments of the cost in the
range of $100-130 billion but also hypothesized that annual expenditures of $5 billion for 20
years might be required42.
The most visible manifestations of public displeasure toward government institutions saw
the growth of public fear about risks affiliated with nuclear power and waste due to leaks at
military storage facilities like the Hanford Plant, growing quantities of nuclear waste and
storage space shortage at existing reactor sites, and the emergence of an avowed antinuclear
movement in the United States following the 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear accident43.
An example of a local demonstration of public opposition to nuclear waste disposal is at
Nevada's Yucca Mountain. DOE had selected this site with congressional approval, as the
nation's principal nuclear waste repository due to its distance from population centers and
geographic isolation. Opposition to this decision from the State of Nevada was significant
and resulted in a deterioration of relations between the state and DOE culminating with the
Nevada legislature passing legislation vetoing placement of the repository in Nevada and
banning highly radioactive waste storage within the state. This, in turn, led to courtroom litigation, which, although unsuccessful from Nevada's perspective, resulted in de facto termination of DOE activity at this site as the 1980s ended44.

-

4.2. Setting up operations

This accumulated climate of public skepticism ranks as a significant backdrop to DNFSB's initial operating environment. As the DNFSB began operations in late 1989 and early
1990, it is important to understand what the agency perceived as its institutional purpose. In
its first annual report to the Congress, the DNFSB used the following language to describe its
raison d'etre:
The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. . . was created to provide advice and formal recommendations to the President and Secretary of Energy regarding public health
and safety issues at Department of Energy (DOE) defense nuclear facilities. By statute,
the Board is required to review and evaluate the content and implementation of health
and safety standards, as well as other requirements, relating to the design, construction,
operation, and decommissioning of DOE defense nuclear facilities. The Board must
then recommend to the Secretary of Energy any specific measures, such as changes in
the content and implementation of those standards, that the Board believes should be
adopted to ensure that the public health and safety are adequately protected. The Board
is also required to review the design of all new defense nuclear facilities before construction begins, and recommend modifications necessary to protect health and safety.
Board review and advisory responsibilities continue throughout the construction, testing, and operation of new facilities.
More broadly, the Board reviews operations, practices, and occurrences at DOE defense nuclear facilities and makes appropriate recommendations to protect health and
safety. In the event that any aspect of operations, practices, or occurrences reviewed by
the Board is determined to present an imminent or severe threat to public health or
safety, the Board transmits its recommendations directly to the resident“'.
Following the swearing in of presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed members Edson Case, John Conway (Board Chair), John Crawford, Jr., A.J. Eggenberger, and Herbert
Kouts, DNFSB operations began by visiting various DOE defense nuclear facilities to become acquainted with their operational issues. The first visit of DNFSB board members and
accompanying expert consultants was to Savannah River from November 7-9, 1989. During
this visit board members and the consultants examined plant operations and practices in seismic engineering, thermal-hydraulics, reactor piping and vessel integrity, operator training
and qualification, and overall plant operational standard^^^. Board members paid particular
attention to the ability of the K, L, and P reactors at Savannah River to resist seismic and
other external events that could potentially jeopardize public safety. These reactors would
play an important role in DNFSB's first recommendation to DOE4'.
DNFSB board members paid additional exploratory visits to the Rocky Flats Plant, the Waste
Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP) near Carlsbad, New Mexico, and Hanford during their early activities. Board members visited Rocky Flats the week of January 15, 1990, to gain knowledge of
plant operations and potential public health and safety problems such operations might cause.
During their visit, Board members met with Colorado Governor Roy Roemer, Representative
David Skaggs, representatives from diverse citizen organizations with environmental and nuclear proliferation concerns, and labor union officials representing Rocky Flats w0rke1-s~~.

The January 1990 visit to WIPP saw presentations from senior Westinghouse and DOE
officials about the project's history and current management issues it faced. Board members
toured the Waste Handling Building and underground areas used for experiments and site
characterization. Plans were made for follow-up visits including those from expert consultants and board staff personnel. Three board members visited Hanford from December 1 1-13,
1989. They witnessed presentations by Richland Operations Office personnel and Westinghouse contractors on ongoing site clean-up activities, preparations for Purex Plant operations
restarting, activity on the N-Reactor's dry standby status, Plutonium Finishing Plant work,
and the possibility that existing high-level waste storage tanks might be subject to chemical
explosion based on a concern expressed to the Board by Senator John Glenn (D-OH)49.
Data derived from these initial site visits led to the issuance of the Board's first recommendation on February 22, 1990. This document (Recommendation 90-1) dealt with operator training at Savannah River prior to restarting that facility's K, L, and P reactors. Recommendation 90- 1 advised that DOE:
determine and specify the qualifications reactor plant operators and supervisors had to
demonstrate before restarting the these reactors,
identify any differences between its approved qualifications and those adopted by NRC
for comparable civilian nuclear power positions, and
conduct a comprehensive review of reactor operator and supervisor qualifications using
written and oral exams in order to determine requisite training and knowledge for reactor restart.
It was also recommended that:
there be accelerated implementation of a configuration management program to assure
drawings of safety-related systems and procedures are available for operators and supervisors, and
operators and supervisors are qualified in procedures to be used for normal operations
and emergency situations50.
Secretary of Energy James Watkins accepted Recommendation 90-1 on April 10, 1990,
and his plan to implement this recommendation was received by DNFSB on July 13, 1990.
The Board would be also be involved in follow-up monitoring of DOE implementation of
this and subsequent recommendations it would issue5'.

4.3. GAO evaluafionof DNFSB'sfirsf year
A landmark development at the end of DNFSB's first year was the issuance of a General
Accounting Office (GAO) report evaluating its first year of operations. Released in February
1991, this report was generally favorable in its assessment of the Board. The report noted that
the Board had:
established financial operations,
issued recommendations involving major DOE facilities at Hanford, Rocky Flats, Savannah River, and WIPP, and
addressed issues such as operator training, safety standards, and radioactive waste storage52.

GAO noted that DNFSB was limited in its ability to cany out its functions by being unable to offer sufficient salaries to attract qualified scientific and technical staff as reflected in
the presence of only 10 technical staffers as of December 10, 1990. The report also noted that
these salary restraints were no longer in effect due to the November 1990 passage of Public
Law 101-510, giving DNFSB the requisite hiring authority to attract desired employee^^^.
The GAO report also noted weaknesses in DNFSB practices. It stressed the need for the
Board to ensure its independence from DOE, documenting its activities in ways conducive to
congressional oversight and public information access, and to plan for future work priorities.
Specific recommendations fiom GAO stressed that:
DNFSB include written criteria to determine when DOE defense nuclear facility health
and safety concerns would result in the issuance of formal recommendations to the Secretary of Energy,
all hiring and contractual arrangements be reviewed to determine potential conflicts of
interest between DOE and the contractor,
DNFSB notify the public of all situations where potential conflict of interest situations
are unavoidable and in the government's best interest,
document all safety and health issue reviews of defense nuclear facilities including
board meetings, discussions, analysis, and agreements with DOE, and
DNFSB's Chair direct preparation of a strategic plan for identifying future Board work
areas54.
The DNFSB agreed with many of the GAO report recommendations. However, it took issue with the report's admonition that it stay "at arms length" from DOE by maintaining that
oversight agencies such as GAO, agency Inspector General offices, and congressional committees work best when they are able to work in cooperation with officials of the agency under scrutiny. DNFSB contended that its not having an adversarial relationship with DOE and
that it was not indicative of a failure to maintain its independence from DOE. Board members also criticized the usefulness of written procedures for determining when its recommendations were essential for adequate public health and safety by stating that a variety of circumstances could result in its issuing such recommendation^^^.
Despite its disagreement with GAO recommendations in the aforementioned areas, the
Board made a concrete demonstration of its commitment to public information access by creating a public reading room, providing information on Board activities through the reading
room and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, opening public meetings under the
Government in Sunshine Acts6, allowing public comment on Board recommendations, and
consulting with workers' representatives at defense nuclear facilities and the general public s7.
4.4. DNFSB site recommendations

The recommendations DNFSB has issued and DOE has implemented are important to understand how defense nuclear policies are carried out by both of these organizations. These recommendations come about fiom ongoing site visits by DNFSB personnel to DOE defense nuclear facilities and are intended to correct ongoing or potential operational shortcomings that
have the potential to threaten public safety. Examining the nature and content of these recom-

mendations can be demonstrated by the following summary of DNFSB recommendations toward specific defense nuclear facilities such as Savannah River, Rocky Flats, and Hanford.
4.4.1. Savannah River recommendations
Problems at the Savannah River site have played an ongoing role in DNFSB oversight activities and would often be a featured subject of the Board's attention. The first recommendation
issued in conjunction with Savannah River activities and operations was Recommendation 9 1-2
on March 27, 199 1, and concerned resolving safety issues prior to restarting the K-reactor.
Specific contents of this recommendation were that each closure package describing the reasons for the K-reactor shutdown in the Reactor Operations Management Plan (ROMP) contain
a succinct narrative discussion clarifying the meaning of the issue in question, describing steps
taken to resolve past practice deficiencies, stating the reason for maintaining that closure packages have been achieved, that referenced documents support closure claims, and that DOE return to filly reviewing and concurring with determinations for each closure issues8.
Recommendation 91-5 grappled with power limits for K-Reactor operations. Issued on
December 19, 199 1, this recommendation reviewed plans for this reactor, which included
limiting its power to 30 percent (approximately 720 megawatts) of what had historically been
its fill operating power. DNFSB concludcd that operation of this reactor at this 30 percent
maximum would not impose an undue risk to public health and safety if all other rcquisite
startup measures were completed and effectively i m ~ l e m e n t e d ~ ~ .
Additional provisions of this recommendation included DOE conducting more definitive
studies on thermal-hydraulic methodology, criteria, and experimental test programs used in
analyzing K-reactor core-cooling performance during unusual conditions, that any proposal
to operate K-reactor at a level above 30 percent be supported by revised accident analysis
thermal-hydraulic methodology, and that the evaluation model for postulated coolant accident loss be documented and controlled in accordance with Code of Federal Regrlations Title 10, Section 50.46 standards".
The issuance of Recommcndation 92-1 on May 2 1, 1992, saw DNFSB recommend that
DOE defer resuming processing of the HB-Line of reactors pending issuance of a report on
various safety and operational issues6'. Eight days later DNFSB would issue a more detailed
recommendation on this issue. Recommendation 92-3 asserted that the following steps
should be taken prior to resuming HB-Line operations:

1. DOE direct its Westinghouse contractor to reopen its operational readiness review
(ORR) in accordance with previous DNFSB recommendations and DOE implementation plans at other facilities.
2. Establishing comprehensive criteria documents for judging and measuring reactor restart readiness.
3. Westinghouse issue a Readiness to Proceed Memorandum requesting DOE approval to
resume operations once it completed its ORR and determined appropriate safety issues
are resolved.
4. DOE providing appropriate assistance to Westinghouse as it conducts the ORR.
5. A DOE ORR team conduct an independent and comprehensive ORR for HB-Line after
Westinghouse conducts an ORR and issues a Readiness to Proceed Memorandum requesting DOE approval for operations resumption.

6. That DOE's ORR team consist of individuals experienced with all operational facets
and be independent of HB-Line management responsibilities to achieve independent
and unbiased assessments.
7. DOE and Westinghouse should prepare for the ORR by ensuring accident analyses include all credible scenarios, identifying appropriate on-site and off-site accident mitigation systems, and that updated Fire Hazards Analysis information is consistent with
accident analyses.
8. Westinghouse and DOE should complete their compliance assessment of DOE safety
orders at HB-Line and implement requisite compensatory measures to achieve order
compliance and safe resumption of HB-Line operation^^^.
Recommendation 96-1, issued on August 14, 1996, dealt with Savannah River's In-Tank
Precipitation System. This particular system plays an important role in removing high-level
radioactive waste from storage tanks at this site. In this recommendation, DNFSB advised
against proceeding with a process verification test without better understanding of benzene
mechanisms formation, generation, and release, and that additional investigative effort
should uncover the reason for the apparent decomposition of tetraphenylborate compounds,
establish the chemical and physical mechanisms determining the extent of benzene retention
in the waste slurry, and affirm the adequacy of existing safety measures".

4.4.2. Rocky Flats recommendutions
DOE operations at Rocky Flats have long been a source of concern. A major fire in Buildings 776-777 during 1969 stemmed from the ignition of a briquette of machine turnings. This
fire would ultimately produce several fire safety improvements throughout DOE's weapons
complex including the area of plutonium metal fabricatiod4. Plutonium storage pits were
produced at Rocky Flats until 1989. Many environmentally dangerous chemicals can no
longer be used for production and some of Rocky Flats' older technological processes cannot
be transferred or reproduced consequently leaving significant quantities of dangerous plutonium waste at Rocky Flats65.
These and other Rocky Flats problems would culminate in a June 1992 plea bargain agreement between Rocky Flats contractor, the Rockwell Corporation, and the U.S. Department of
Justice (DOJ) following a five-year investigation by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) against Rockwell. This investigation
found that DOE and Rockwell failed to produce an adequate waste disposal analysis plan,
did not store waste with a permit as required by the Resource Conservation Recovery Act
(RCRA), failed to maintain an accurate operations record, and failed to provide written notification of incidents requiring a contingency plad6.
This background of environmental and legal troubles influenced DNFSB's Rocky Flats
activities. Its first recommendation covering Rocky Flats operations was issued May 3,
1990. Recommendation 90-4 decreed that there be an independent assessment of the adequacy and correctness of utility systems operating procedures at Rocky Flats, the need for
an assessment of the knowledge level acquired during operator requalification, that test
records and safety systems be examined and calibrated, all plant changes and vital safety
system modifications be reviewed for potential impact on procedures, training, and requalification, and that examinations of each building's final safety analysis report ensure that

plant description, procedures, and accident analysis are consistent with the plant and safety
related modificationsh7.
Two weeks later the Board issued follow-up Recommendation 90-5. Focusing on Rocky
Flats Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP), this pronouncement advised that Rocky Flats'
SEP address and consider the effects of severe external developments such as seismic events
and high winds on plant operations, the effects of severe internal events such as fire, ventilation system performance under severe external and internal events, equipment and structural
interaction under such events, and the basis and procedures for implementing facility
changesh8.
Recommendation 90-6, dated June 4, 1990, provides another demonstration of the emphasis DNFSB placed on Rocky Flats during its initial months. This recommendation examined
criticality safety. It urged that DOE prepare a written program with commitments for addressing the cumulation of fissile and other ventilation duct materials prior to resuming plutonium operations. This program also needed to include a description of remediation actions
deemed necessary for DOE resumption of plutonium operations at Rocky Flats, descriptions
and justification of non-destructive assay techniques, calibration, modeling, and methodology, and estimating gamma ray and fast neutron radiation levels in occupancy areas69.
Additional stipulations of Recommendation 90-6 included determinations of requisite design and operational changes in ventilation ducts and related systcrns to precludc hrther fissile
material cumulation that could threaten public health and safety and establishing a monitoring
program to guarantee the effectiveness of ventilation duct design and operational changes7'.
Recommendation 9 1-4, issued on September 30, 1991, noted that some corrective actions had
been taken at Rocky Flats. This document went on to advise that DOE complete an Operational
Readiness Review (ORR) for Building 559, that there be an assessment of knowledge levels
achieved during operator requalification, that test records and safety calibration systems be examined, verification that all plant changes involving vital safety systems be reviewed for potential
impacts on procedures and training, and that the ORR team's final report include description of
remaining issues needing resolution before Building 559 can resume plutonium operations7'.
September 26, 1994, saw DNFSB issue Recommendation 94-3 on Rocky Flats dealing
with Building 371. This building was considered Rocky Flats' prime sight for plutonium
storage. In its recommendation, DNFSB espoused the development of an integrated plan to
address civil, structural, and seismic safety issues and evaluations concerning the planned
plutonium storage use of Building 37 1, that this plan address and explain required changes to
the current Safety Analysis Report, and how such changes would be accomplished. Additional stipulations of this recommendation included comprehensive structural analysis and
methodology of building analysis standards as applied to Building 37 1, that hazard classification for this structure be supported by rational analysis, the classification of safety systems,
the use of standards for evaluating natural and man-made hazards be similar to those used in
commercial nuclear practice, and that program plan results be used to specify building upgrades consistent with Building 37 1's mission72.
4.4.3. Hanford recommendations
Hanford received early and frequent visits from DNFSB members during the Board's initial year of operations. An early topic of Board interest at Hanford was the susceptibility of

old single-shell high-level waste tanks to spontaneous explosion, which could release a large
amount of radioactive material to the surrounding environment. During its investigations of
this possibility at Hanford, the Board concluded that the possibility of such an explosion was
low. At the same time, though, Board members held lingering concerns about uncertainty
over the composition of Hanford waste tanks contents and their physical conditions.
These residual concerns led the DNFSB to issue Recommendation 90-3 on March 27, 1990.
This recommendation advocated studying possible chemical reactions that could be the source
of heat generation in Hanford's single-shell tanks, that DOE develop a continuous monitoring
program to indicate possible development of unstable conditions in these tanks, providing alarm
indicators in monitoring instruments to facilitate talung action to neutralize perceived abnormalities, and developing an action to plan to neutralize conditions signaled by these alarms73.
DNFSB received notification of DOE's decision to comply with Recommendation 90-3
on May 10, 1990, and the Board received DOE's implementation plan for this recommendation on August 10, 1990. DNFSB members, though, decided that DOE's implementation
plan was "insufficiently responsive" to its earlier recommendations. Consequently, they issued Recommendation 90-7 on October 1 1, 199074.
Reflecting the Board's intent that their earlier recommendations be adhered to, this particular recommendation went into considerable detail. Specific provisions included the need for
immediate steps to be taken to add necessary single-shell tank instrumentation to establish
whether hot spots exist or may develop in the stored waste, installing instrumentation to
monitor cover gas composition and the possible presence of flammable gas, accelerating tank
sampling contents programs, the need for a program to study the possibility of a violent
chemical waste reaction, developing an action plan to neutralize conditions that may be signaled by alarms, and formulating and instituting a separate emergency plan in the event of an
explosion or airborne release of radioactive material to protect onsite and external personne17j.
The Board's next recommendation for Hanford was issued on July 6, 1992. Recommendation 92-4 dealt with a projected Multi-Function Waste Tank (MFWT) to be located at Hanford as a part of an existing tank waste remedial system program. DNFSB recommended that
MFWT's design needed to be conservative in terms of safety and that it have clearly defined
and coherent design criteria. Its design, construction, and start-up activities were to be executed by individuals who could provide the requisite quality for public health and safety protection. Additional components of this recommendation included advocacy of design continuity through all project phases, the responsible DOE organization having technically
qualified personnel involved, participating DOE and contractor organizations having their
functions and responsibilities clearly delineated in a single document, and identifying the design bases and engineering principles for the MFWT project that will show MFWT meeting
existing quantitative safety goals of DOE's Nuclear Safety Policy76.
The following year saw the issuance of Recommendation 93-5 concerning Hanford operations. Covering Hanford waste tanks characterization studies, this recommendation alluded to a
recently released DOE audit noting significant weaknesses in Hanford's sampling, laboratory,
and core management activities. Specific aspects of this recommendation were that DOE engage in a comprehensive reexamination and restructuring of Hanford characterization efforts
and sampling schedules, develop a prioritized schedule of tanks to be sampled, increase laboratory capacity and activities dedicated to tank sample analysis, and explore the possible utility of

on-site and off-site laboratory services. Supplemental components of this recommendation included integrating the characterization effort into the tank waste remediation system engineering effort, critically examining the list of chemical analyses to the smallest set needed to hlfill
safety requirements, and strengthening the management and conduct of sampling operation^^^.

4.5. Other DNFSB recommendations
Although Savannah k v e r , Rocky Flats, and Hanford have been the subject of much DNFSB
activity and recommendations, other defense nuclear facilities and subjects have also received
DNFSB scrutiny. One of these facilities is DOE'S Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP) located
near Carlsbad, New Mexico. Congress authorized this controversial facility in 1979 to dispose
of transuranic wastes generated during nuclear weapons production and to demonstrate that nuclear waste disposal facilities could protect the environment and public safety78.
Introductory exploration and investigation of WIPP operations led the Board to issue Recommendation 9 1-3 on April 25, 1991. Contents of t h s recommendation required that DOE authorize
an independent and comprehensive readiness review at WIPP before testing waste disposal procedures, that team members canying out the readiness review be experienced in all facets of the operations involved and be independent of WIPP. The readiness review team was to confer with
other DOE readiness review teams. Additional recommendation components stipulated assessing
the adequacy and correctness of normal and emergency waste handling and utility systems procedures, assessing the knowledge level achieved during operator qualification reviews, assessing
operational issues such as the interrelationships, delineated roles, and responsibilities among contractor and DOE units at Carlsbad and Sandia National Laboratory on issues involving WIPP79.
Recommendation 92-6, dealing with operational readiness reviews, was issued on August
26, 1992. This recommendation advised that DOE quickly develop effective rules, procedures, orders, and directives to govern safety aspects of this review process, develop specific
criteria for determining when ORRs are or are not required, and that the plan for each ORR
incorporate such features as review team members not being involved in the work under review and an assessment of the technical qualifications of DOE field organization members
providing direction and guidance to the participating contractors0.
Four weeks later on September 22, 1992, DNFSB issued Recommendation 92-7. This
document sought to issue guidance on the qualifications of technical personnel and supervisors and defense nuclear facilities. Its contents were particularly motivated by its determination that there were many individuals at such facilities lacking understanding of fundamental
elements of engineering, chemistry, nuclear physics, and radiation protection to operate and
maintain these sites safely. An additional finding buttressing this recommendation was that
written examinations at many sites often consisted of unchallenging multiple choice and
short answer questions that failed to assess adequately operator knowledge or correlate basic
engineering principles with job-specific knowledge requirementss1.
The Board recommended the following steps to resolve what it saw as training and qualification deficiencies at defense nuclear facilities:
DOE take timely action to expand senior management's involvement in implementing
training programs at defense nuclear facilities and enhancing senior management's

communication of the importance of effective training and qualification programs to all
levels in relevant DOE and contractor organizations.
DOE strengthen organizational units responsible for training and qualification at all applicable DOE entities.
Accelerate internal DOE efforts to improve training and qualifications programs of operations, maintenance and technical support personnel at defense nuclear facilities.
DOE and its contractors establish and implement measures to improve training and qualification programs as specified in Recommendation 90- 1 concerning Savannah Rivers2.
A related concern for personnel technical quality was also demonstrated in Recommendation 93-3 issued on June 1, 1993. In this document, the DNFSB advocated DOE establish a
means to attract and retain exceptional scientific and technical personnel as a primary agency
goal, that DOE seek excepted appointment authority for selected key engineering and scientific personnel in DOE program offices, line units, and defense nuclear complex oversight
units, and that the Department develop a system for using personnel attrition to build technical capability. Additional recommendation provisions included reviewing the effectiveness
of the technical employees performance appraisal system, using respected independent external organizations such as the National Research Council to assess DOE'S present and
planned hture actions for attracting and retaining qualified technical personnel, perform an
in-depth assessment of educational and experience requirements for key positions, and evaluate incumbents for their ability to meet qualification requirements".
Additional documentation of DNFSB concern about defense nuclear personnel technical
qualification issues is reflected in the December 10, 1993, issuance of Recommendation 93-6.
Dealing with maintaining access to nuclear weapons expertise in the defense nuclear complex, it
placed particular emphasis on the need for retaining personnel with such knowledge for nuclear
weapons disassembly at the Pantex site near Amarillo, Texas, and for nuclear explosives testing
at the Nevada Test Sites4.
Provisions of this recommendation included that DOE initiate a formal process to identify
the skills and knowledge needed to develop or verify safe dismantling or modification procedures for all remaining U.S. nuclear weapons types, start a similar process to identify the requisite skills and knowledge to conduct nuclear testing operations safely, review the personnel
losses at nuclear weapons labs and the Nevada Test Site to determine which skills would be lost
though personnel departure, and that DOE and defense nuclear contractors negotiate the continuing availability of personnel scheduled to leave whose skills and knowledge are determined
to be important. Subsequent recommendation stipulations were the initiation of programs to obtain and record from these personnel undocumented anecdotal technical information that would
enhance the technical knowledge of hture personnel, developing procedures for safe weapons
system disassembly while personnel with such expertise are still available, instituting a program for maintaining operational expertise for nuclear weapons testing if such testing is resumed in the future at the Nevada Test Site, and determining if traditional dependence on administrative controls to ensure nuclear explosive safety is adequate given the loss of
experienced personnel and the potential future resumption of nuclear testings5.
Safety management is an integral component of DNFSB's institutional purpose and this
subject, as applied to DOE nuclear facilities, constitutes the heart of Recommendation 95-2

issued October 1 1, 1995. This recommendation, replacing Recommendations 90-2 and 92-5,
saw DNFSB recommend that DOE institutionalize the process of incorporating environmental, safety, and health objectives and controls into the planning and execution of all major defense nuclear activity involving hazardous materials, requiring all operations and activities
involving radioactive and other substantially hazardous substances in the defense nuclear
complex to be subjected to appropriately graded Safety Management Plans, establishing a
new list of facilities and activities prioritized on hazard and importance to defense clean-up
activities, promulgating requirements and instructions for carrying out such clean-up and
safety programs, and taking necessary measures to ensure that DOE has or acquires the technical expertise required to implement the recommended streamlined processR6.
Another noteworthy DNFSB recommendation is Recommendation 97-1. Issued on March
3, 1997, this document deals with the Uranium-233 (U-233) storage safety at DOE facilities.
U.S. stockpiles of this man-made uranium isotope of approximately one ton arc in DOE's possession and its applications included DOE's defense-related activities and nuclear reactor programs supported by DOE and commercial companies. U-233's storage under conditions in
which its physical deterioration can occur and the multifaceted responsibility for U-233
throughout DOE prompted DNFSB's issuance of this recommendation. Provisions of this recommendation were that DOE establish a single organizational project to deal with U-233 safe
storage issues, develop packaging, transport, and interim and long-term storage standards for
U-233, characterize the quantity and condition of U-233 in DOE defense nuclear facilities,
evaluate the appropriateness and condition of DOE's vaults and U-233 storage systems, initiate a program to remedy observed shortfalls in DOE's ability to maintain U-233 in acceptable interim storage, establish a plan of measures for eventually placing U-233 in safe permanent storage, and take measures to ensure that DOE retains the requisite technical knowledge
and competence to carry out safe U-233 shortage on a short- and long-term basiss7.

4.6. Recommendations summary
Board recommendations encompass the diverse array of activities at DOE's defense nuclear facilities. Many of these recommendations deal with specific operational issues at individual facilities such as reactor safety at Savannah River and plutonium storage usage at
Rocky Flats. Other recommendations have dealt with potential hture issues such as crisis
management at individual facilities and taking measures to ensure that facility and contractor
workforce personnel possess the requisite technical expertise for managing defense nuclear
facilities. The detailed nature of these recommendations and the carehl thought and analysis
underlying these documents testifies to the importance Board members place upon their intrinsic intellectual credibility and upon fulfilling the Board's statutory obligation to ensure
the safety of the United States' defense nuclear facilities.

5. Other noteworthy developments
A significant demonstration of DNFSB's high credibility with DOE is the Secretary of
Energy's acceptance of all 38 Board recommendations issued during the DNFSB's institutional life even though Congress granted it action-forcing instead of regulatory powers. DOE

has completed implementation of a majority of Board recommendations and is making
progress completing those that have not been implementedgg.
DNFSB carried out 300 site visits to DOE nuclear facilities in 1998 and Board members,
staff, and contractor experts had made 1,398 cumulative site visits to these facilities between
October 1989 and the end of 1998. These activities have also been carried out in an environment of ongoing administrative upheaval in DOE'S highest echelons which is influenced by
the political upheaval experienced by DOE during this period and by normal upper-level administrative turnover in cabinet departments. Documentation of this politically based instability is demonstrated by the presence of seven Secretaries or Acting Secretaries of Energy,
six different Deputy or Acting Deputy Secretaries (a seventh has been nominated), and seven
Under or Acting Under Secretaries of Energy during DNFSB's nine years of operationg9.
In contrast to this high-level administrative turnover in DOE, DNFSB Board membership
has remained remarkably stable. Three of the Board's five initial members (Conway, Eggenberger, and Kouts) have been reappointed, reconfirmed, and remain members a decade later.
Board member Edson Case died in 1991. Joseph DiNunno replaced Case upon Senate confirmation in 199290. John Mansfield, whose nomination, confirmation, and swearing in occurred in October and November 1997, replaced John Crawford9'.
Although legally authorized to hire up to 150 hll-timc employees, the Board had hired
only 90 full-time staff in addition to the five Board members to accomplish its activities by
the beginning of 1999. Technical staff personnel have extensive experience in fields such as
physics and nuclear, mechanical, electrical, chemical, structural, and metallurgical engineering. Twenty-five percent of the Board's technical staff possess Ph.D. degrees and an additional 72 percent have masters degrees. This educational experience is hrther augmented by
staffers having practical nuclear experience from the U.S. Navy's nuclear propulsion program, the nuclear weapons field, and the civilian reactor industryg2.
5.1. Controversy over external regulation

The political currents of larger agencies can affect the operations of smaller agencies that
are supervised by the larger agency or have significant interaction with a larger agency. Political winds buffeting DOE during the 1990s affected DNFSB. Already documented instances of inept and imprudent nuclear materials handling by DOE, its predecessors, and
contractors at DOE'S defense nuclear complex created an environment conducive to congressional criticism of DOE operations.
One manifestation of these attacks on DOE nuclear policy came during the 103rd Congress (1993-1994). On February 28, 1994, Representative George Miller (D-CA), then chair
of the House Committee on Natural Resources, introduced H.R. 3920. This bill, known as
the "Federal Nuclear Facilities Licensing and Regulation Act," would have required the
NRC to license all new DOE nuclear weapons and research facilities9'. Its provisions also
provided for the creation of a presidential commission to review options for regulating existing DOE nuclear facilities, including the possibility of independent regulation. Although this
commission's membership would include the DNFSB chair or a designated representative,
the provision of the proposed bill creating a presidential study commission was dismissed by
the Board as "duplicative and time-consumingwg4.

The House Natural Resources Committee held hearings on H.R. 3920 on March 1 and 8,
1994. Testifying before the committee, DNFSB chair Conway contended that DOE was not
self-regulating in regards to its defense nuclear facilities. He mentioned that nuclear facilities
were subject to federal environmental laws and were overseen by agencies as diverse as the
EPA, the Department of Transportation, the Mine Safety and Health Administration, the
NRC, the DNFSB's own recommendations, and state environmental statutes. He went on to
maintain that safety at these facilities stemmed from technically qualified personnel adhering
to clear and specific safety principles and standards and that licensing, regulation, external
oversight, and enforcement authority could not create safe conditions on their own. This DNFSB opposition contributed to H.R. 3920's demiseg5.
A 1998 governmental report on DOE nuclear facilities provides the following perspective
on the historical and contemporary factors influencing DOE's regulatory regime and the
emergence of legislation such as H.R. 3920.
Until the mid-1980s, DOE's regulatory history was shaped by the authorities for the
principal missions of the Department and its predecessors: nuclear weapons and nuclear
power. Under the authority [of] the Manhattan Project and the Atomic Energy Act
(AEA) and its various amendments, for nearly half a century DOE and its predecessors
operated the vast majority of the Federal government's nuclear research and production
facilities essentially exempt from outside regulation. This self-regulation excluded
other Federal agencies, States, local jurisdictions, and the general public from participation in health and safety oversight and decision-making for these activities. The 1970s
and 1980s saw enactment of major environmental legislation applicable to DOE, growing public awareness and concern about the health and safety management of the DOE
nuclear complex, successful lawsuits, and the winding down of the Cold War. As a result of these and other factors, DOE gradually has become subject to increasing environmental regulation and other forms of oversight. Nonetheless, today DOE continues
to self-regulate major aspects of its nuclear operations, including all worker safety; almost all of the design, operation, and decommissioning of its nuclear facilities; and
some of its environmental discharges and waste management96.

5.2. Ahearne report
Legislative pressure, as manifest in H.R. 3920 and the accompanying hearing, as well as
the political, legal, and regulatory environment, led to a January 1995 announcement by Energy Secretary Hazel 07Leary of the formation of a committee to explore placing DOE nuclear activities under additional federal agency regulation9'. This committee, chaired by Dr.
John Ahearne of Duke University and known as the Ahearne Committee, met throughout
that year and issued its report in December 1995.
The Ahearne report presents an exhaustive portrait of regulatory issues confronting DOE
nuclear facilities. Focusing on the current regulatory roles played by NRC and DNFSB, this
report examined what it saw as the strengths and weaknesses of each of these organizations.
Committee members noted NRC's long experience in nuclear safety regulation, its possession of an existing regulatory structure, and the presence of numerous experienced personnel
with relevant scientific and technical expertise along with flexible hiring authority. These

panelists also noted the potential for inertia at NRC in responding to new regulatory responsibilities and the difficulty it would face coping with the national security issues of DOE's
defense nuclear facilities as opposed to the operating and regulatory environments of commercial nuclear facilitiesy8.
Concerning DNFSB, Ahearne panelists noted DNFSB's experienced scientific and technical personnel, its maturing knowledge of DOE's defense nuclear complex, and its relative
newness contributing to greater latitude in its ability to adopt flexible regulatory models to
accommodate the great diversity of DOE's nuclear facilities. Conversely, Ahearne committee members expressed concern about the DNFSB's lack of enforcement powers, a perception that it is not regarded as being sufficiently open and having to answer to the same checks
and balances as other regulators, and the Board's limited size and budget99.
These factors, coupled with concern over regulatory duplication between NRC and DNFSB, led to the following determination:
Neither NRC nor the DNFSB was designed to carry out the kinds of responsibilities required of a regulator of facility safety at the DOE nuclear complex. Both would have to
undergo significant changes before they could adequately meet those responsibilities.
The Committee did not determine which of the two agencies could more readily undergo these changes. Instead, we present two options for facility operator-NRC with a
more flexible approach and incorporating the resources of the DNFSB, or a restructured
and enlarged DNFSB. We urge that a prompt decision be made on which should be the
facility regulator so that the move to external regulation of facility safety can proceed
expeditiously. In the meantime, actions to implement external regulation of the two
other areas of nuclear safety-worker safety and environmental protection--can and
should proceed independentlyto0.
Given the context of this observation, the Ahearne report prescribed the following concerning DOE nuclear facility regulation and safety:
1. Nearly all safety aspects at DOE's nuclear facilities and sites should be externally

regulated.
2. Existing agencies rather than a new agency should have this responsibility.
3. DOE needed to maintain a strong internal safety management system under any regulatory regimelo'.
The report elaborated on its reasons for reaching these findings by contending that DOE
should be externally regulated for the same reasons industry and other federal facilities are
and that external regulation could meet the demands of both safety and national security if
managed properly. It went on to contend that credibility was critical to the success of safety
regulation and DOE's missions and that safety regulation needed to be effective and promote
efficiency. The following observation on regulatory credibility is particularly salient:
The inherent conflict of interest between mission and self-regulation of safety at DOE,
aggravated by a long legacy of secrecy, is at the root of many of the safety problems in
the nuclear complex. External regulation would end that conflict by placing regulatory
authority in bodies that are, . . . independent, impartial, and competent. It would im-

prove public confidence in the safety of DOE operations by making them subject to the
same kind of independent regulation that applies to other public and private operations.
It would enable the public, States, and Tribes to have opportunities for effective involvement in the regulation of safety at DOE facilities-as they do with similar facilities in the private sector. Finally, only independent, external regulation can ensure the
stable regulatory framework . . . that is required to ensure credibility. The Department
has been unsuccessful in its attempts to achieve credibility under self-regulation and the
level of frustration at the current regulatory regime remains high within the Department, its laboratories, and its contractors, just as the credibility of its safety efforts remains low in the world outside. We believe that external regulation is essential to earning the public confidence the Department seeks and needs to free itself to cany out its
important national missions'02.
Specific governmental organizational changes recommended in the Ahearne report were
that an existing agency such as the NRC and the DNFSB regulate DOE nuclear facilities and
that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulate worker protection
at DOE nuclear facilities, unless such regulation would cause significant interference with
maintaining facility safety. EPA should continue regulating environmental protection matters at DOE nuclear facilities under existing environmental laws, and states with EPA and
OSHA authorized programs or individual facility safety regulators maintain existing roles in
environmental protection, facility safety, and worker protection comparable to those now
used in the private sector. Committee members contended that these and othcr recommended
changes would strengthen, streamline, and simplify safety regulation at DOE nuclear facilities while drawing clearer and simpler lines of responsibility and ac~ountability"'~.

5.3. DNFSB 's response to Ahearne
The Ahearne report did not receive a favorable evaluation at the DNFSB. Although agreeing with some report conclusions, it strongly disagreed with others. Testifying before the
Senate Armed Services Committee on March 6, 1997, Board chair Conway commented that
public trust in DOE would not be increased by establishing another federal agency to regulate its activities. He also questioned whether such additional regulation would improve
safety at DOE nuclear facilities and cited figures from the NRC in which that agency contended it would need 1,100-1,600 additional full-time employees and an annual budget increase of $150-200 million if it were to assume additional regulatory responsibility for DOE.
Speaking for the Board, Conway went on to observe: "We know of no organization in government or private industry that reduces personnel or response costs when additional regulatory authorities are imposed upon it. The opposite occurs"'04.
DNFSB member Joseph DiNunno served on the Ahearne panel and was also critical of its
findings. He criticized what he saw as insufficient factual rigor and objectivity in parts of the
report. DiNunno went on to mention DOE'S current subjection to many more statutory environmental requirements than in the period before 1980 when most conditions requiring environmental remediation were created. He also observed that regulatory processes involving
statutorily provided public participation opportunities may need to be limited for national security reasons and for programs requiring expedited clean-uplo'.

DiNunno also asserted that DOE should follow regulatory principles emphasizing the following characteristics:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Attacking current instead of historical regulatory problems.
Regulating only to the extent needed to achieve the desired behavior.
Facilitating technical solutions instead of constructing unnecessary process impediments.
Allowing flexibility in establishing requirements tailored to work hazards.
Structuring regulations to encourage good safety practices instead of fearing penalties.
Minimizing costs and maximizing benefits.
Minimizing regulatory overlap and duplication.
Encouraging intra-government ~ooperation''~.

Board opposition to external regulation of DOE nuclear facilities did not diminish with the
passage of time. A November 1998 DNFSB report for Congress on this subject expanded on the
Board's earlier opposition to external regulation. This document maintained that shifting regulatory control of its nuclear facilities to an external agency would diminish the importance of national security in DOE plant operations. It also observed that such external regulation would be
incapable of handling DOE's nuclear weapons testing, maintenance, stewardship, and clean-up
programs and commented on the improvements that the DNFSB and DOE had achleved over
the past decade in defense nuclear facility safety and environmental protection programs"'.
This report also heralded what it regarded as the advantages of continuing DNFSB oversight of
defense nuclear facilities. Specific benefits of continuing existing oversight arrangements included the lack of undue interference with critical national defense and security functions at these
facilities and the enhanced cost-efficiency of Board oversight as evidenced by its total Fiscal Year
(FY) 1999 budget of $16.5 million for all defense nuclear facilities as opposed to the $3 million
spent by NRC per reactor per year in its commercial regulatory and licensing activities'''.
Additional advantages of maintaining the current regulatory regime cited by DNFSB were
the flexibility provided by Board oversight, that DNFSB recommendations could be accepted or rejected, and that the Board is a neutral party interested in safety and achieving
oversight success. Further attributes include the public availability of Board recommendations unless national security considerations prevail, the presence of a well-established DNFSB organizational structure and technical expertise, and that shifting regulatory structure
would disrupt progress being made under Board recornrnendati~ns'~~.
DNFSB opposition to creating a new regulatory regime for defense nuclear facilities was
also demonstrated by its assertion that a new regulatory structure would create a time-consuming and cumbersome legal framework, increase the costs of bringing facilities into compliance with new rules, result in less safety at defense nuclear facilities, and ultimately diminish DOE's stature as a center of nuclear technical e~cellence"~.

6. Proposed DOE elimination

An additional complication for DNFSB arose with the onset of the 104th Congress in
1995. The declared intention of many members of the newly ascendant Republican majority
was abolishing DOE and transferring some of its programs to other federal agencies while

privatizing others. On April 16, 1996, Senator Rod Grams (R-MN) introduced S. 1678 the
"Department of Energy Abolition Act""'. This legislation called for the establishment of an
independent executive branch agency called the Energy Programs Resolution Agency that
would oversee DOE's dismantlement. Where DNFSB activities are concerned, S. 1678
called for the creation of a Defense Nuclear Programs Agency that would be part of the Department of Defense (DOD) and have jurisdiction over military uses of nuclear energy and
nuclear weapons, be responsible for environmental restoration at defense nuclear facilities,
and supervise operations at Sandia, Los Alamos, and Lawrence Livermore National
~aboratoriesl12.
This legislation did not pass during the 104th Congress due to DOE-initiated budget and
staff reductions, DOE's vigorous defense of its mission, and divisions among congressional
Republicans over DOE's future but it did prompt legislation with similar intent in the 105th
C ~ n g r e s s " ~Rep.
. Todd Tiahrt (R-KS) introduced H.R. 1577 on May 8, 1997, with 45 cosponsors. Although this legislation also failed to pass, the presence of a significant number of
cosponsors and the persistence of anti-DOE sentiment within Congress were clear warning
signs to DOE and federal agencies doing business with DOE (such as DNFSB) of the need to
change ongoing operation^"^.
Congressional concerns with DOE covered a variety of issues. During a September 19,
1996, House National Security Committee DOE oversight hearing, Rep. Duncan Hunter
(R-CA) maintained that DOE was not fulfilling its commitments to maintain the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. Hunter went on to criticize the
Clinton administration for giving DOE weapons scientists, engineers, and skilled laborers
the impossible mission of maintaining a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile without nuclear
testing, giving complex workers insufficient resources and support to modernize the nuclear weapons complex, and allowing the departure of skilled personnel from DOE's nuclear weapons programs115.
A Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee hearing on September 4, 1996, provided some insight into DNFSB thinking on the possible abolition of DOE. Testifying before
the committee, Board member John Crawford stated that it would be ill advised to transfer
DNFSB functions to DOD since it would not be possible for the Board to provide independent and critical evaluation of defense nuclear facilities. Crawford also maintained that Congress had made a wise decision in crafting the 1946 Atomic Energy Act when it created a
separation between DOD and the AEC for the production, delivery, and possible use of nuclear weapons' 16.
He also asserted that there had been a decline in the qualifications of military officers assigned to DOE'S nuclear weapons programs which he partially attributed to a belief among
military officers that nuclear weapons specialization was not career enhancing. In addition,
he stressed his belief that current overall capabilities of DOE nuclear weapons personnel did
not meet the requisite high standards. A way Crawford saw of rectifying this technical qualifications problem would be the creation of a joint nuclear weapons directorate. A military officer or civilian would head such an organization and would report directly to the Secretaries
of Energy and Defense and serve a term of six-to-eight years'".
A trenchant critique of DOE operations was provided by the testimony of Jerry Taylor the
Natural Resources Studies director from the libertarian think-tank, the Cato Institute. Tay-

lor's critique favored eliminating DOE and replacing the DNFSB with a National Nuclear
Weapons Agency (NNWA) under the direction of a sub-cabinet civilian official to supervise
national nuclear weapons programs, civilian radioactive waste, and weapons clean-up operations. NNWA would operate under DOD's budget and weapons program review. The Cato
Institute analysis also expressed the belief that transferring weapons-related programming
from DOE to DOD was preferred because defense-related activities belonged to the agency
and budget responsible for national defense, putting such programs in an existing department
would prevent bureaucratic "mission creep" which it saw as occurring with nuclear weapons
at the AEC, and merging nuclear weapons producers and customers produced enhanced national strategy coordination. This merged administrative structure would, in Taylor's assessment, give the American public a more honest accounting of national defense expenditures
instead of spreading them throughout the federal budget'I8.

7. DOE-NRC external regulation pilot project
Ahearne Committee report findings concerning external regulation of DOE nuclear facilities were accepted and endorsed by Energy Secretary O'Leary. She responded by creating a
DOE Working Group on External Regulation, which issued a December 1996 report to provide recommendations for implementing Ahearne report findings in this area. DOE's Working Group determined that NRC should be the principal external regulator and that moving to
external regulation should be phased in over 10 years. Following interagency negotiations
between DOE and NRC, Federico Pena (O'Leary's successor) and NRC Chair Shirley Jackson agreed to the following measures:
To pursue NRC regulation of DOE nuclear facilities at a June 1997 meeting.
DOE and NRC signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in November 1997
designating the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) as the site of the first
pilot project.
Individual facilities at Oak Ridge at Savannah River designated as future sites of NRC
external reg~lation"~.
Testifying before a House Commerce Committee subcommittee on February 11, 1997,
Acting Energy Secretary Charles Curtis said DOE would submit legislation to Congress that
year on implementing external regulationlZ0.Such relatively quick movement by DOE produced an initially positive congressional response to external regulation of DOE nuclear facilities. House Commerce Committee Subcommittee on Energy and Power Chair Rep. Dan
Schaefer (R-CO) expressed such sentiment in a May 20, 1998 hearing:
I want to say from the start that I feel this is one of the most significant issues facing the
Department of Energy today. Independent regulation gets at the crux of DOE's biggest
management problem-the cleanup of sites within the nuclear weapons complex. If the
Department knew that a regulator with full enforcement authority was watching over its
shoulders, many DOE sites would be managed more efficiently and safely. Had such a
watchdog been required for DOE sites from the beginning I think we could have avoided
many of the massive environmental problems that the DOE complex faces todayI2'.

8. GAO evaluation of DOE external regulation
A less sanguine assessment of DOE'S external regulation strategy was provided by a May
1998 GAO report for the House Science Committee. This report contended that DOE's actual position on external regulation was unclear because its decision to conduct pilot projects
(such as the NRC MOU) represented a shift in its formerly strong endorsement of external
regulation of all DOE facilities. GAO observed that this change by DOE caused both the
NRC and OSHA to question DOE's actual commitment to external r e g ~ l a t i o n ' ~ ~ .
Additional GAO findings asserted that while the DOE-NRC pilot project at LBNL would
provide useful insights, it did not represent the size and complexity of DOE's overall nuclear
complex and would not yield the practical data necessary for addressing numerous critical external regulation issues. For instance, the LBNL, Oak Ridge, and Savannah River sites covered by
the pilot projects do not contain nuclear reactors, weapons plants, or heavily contaminated facilities. Such defense and environmental sites constitute 80 percent of DOE'S nuclear complex and
represent the environments responsible for initiating DOE exploration of external reg~lation'~'.
GAO also criticized DOE for not integrating OSHA with NRC in its pilot projects. The
absence of such integration, according to GAO, resulted in the creation of several working
groups and steering committees on external regulation of DOE facilities within these agencies. A consequent result of these multifaceted administrative approaches sees these three
agencies proceeding on different tracks and schedules toward extcrnal regulation without
having a single structure to integrate their respective positions and strategiesI2'.
GAO's evaluation of the DOE-NRC pilot project also observed that defense nuclear facilities represent a significant part of DOE's nuclear complex and the substantive contributions
of DNFSB in improving safety at these facilities would have to be included if DOE desired a
complete exploration of all relevant external regulation issues125.
DOE Deputy Secretary of Energy Elizabeth A. Moler criticized GAO's finding that
DOE's position on external regulation was unclear or inconsistent. Moler maintained that
there would be clear benefits from external regulation of DOE facilities and that the transition to external regulation required careful design and management. She also asserted that
DOE intended to overcome legal, institutional, and technical difficulties on external regulation by working closely with the NRC and OSHA to propose classes of DOE facilities that
could be subjected to a "responsibly implemented" external regulatory regime126.
Moler's comments, though, could not prevent a change in the initially favorable congressional response to proposed external regulation of DOE nuclear facilities to which the critical
GAO report probably contributed. This shift in sentiment is best expressed in the Senate
Armed Services Committee's May 11, 1998, report on the 1999 Defense Department budget
authorization section covering DNFSB:
The committee is not convinced that external regulation of new or existing DOE defense
nuclear facilities will increase safety, decrease cost, or improve operational efficiency at
such facilities. The committee notes that transfer of the Paducah gaseous diffusion plant
from DOE to NRC regulation cost over $200 million and took three years to complete.
The committee is concerned that the implementation of an additional external regulation
approach could draw scarce resources away from high priority, compliance driven clean-up

actions and critical national security activities, with little added benefit. The committee believes that no decisions should be made or actions taken until the findings of the DNFSB and
the comments of the Secretary of Energy and Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Cornrnission have been provided and the ongoing external regulation pilot program is completed. The
committee will be extensively involved in any movement toward an alternative external regulation approachI2'.

9. Congressional assessments of DNFSB performance
DNFSB's congressional oversight committees have generally given favorable appraisals of
Board activities. The Senate Armed Services committee 1999 budget authorization report for
DNFSB noted that the Board "continues to provide exceptional and effective external oversight
with a budget that equals about one-tenth of one percent of total Atomic Energy Defense hnding"128.The previous year this committee also praised DNFSB for successhlly pushing DOE to
improve nuclear safety and that the Board's non-punitive review process created an improved
safety culture at DOE facilities. An additional committee endorsement of DNFSB accomplishments was its assertion that the Board plays an essential role in improving DOE operations and
making them more accountable and that DNFSB should continue in its current role129.
The best illustration of DNFSB's political capital is reflected in its budget authorizations
over its first decade. From an initial appropriation of $7 million for FY 1989, the Board's
budget reached a total of $17 million for FY 1998 representing remarkable growth during a
decade noted for emphasizing federal budgetary deficits and spending rate growth reductions
for numerous federal agenciesI3O.

10. Concern over DOE nuclear complex technical expertise

In addition to its clean-up and safety oversight responsibilities, DNFSB members will
have to contend with numerous additional issues in the years ahead. One of these issues concerns the technical qualifications of workers in the defense nuclear complex to which the
Board alluded in Recommendation 93-6. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 23, 1994, Conway expressed his concern about this emerging issue:
One of the biggest technical challenges and uncertainties results from the physical condition of facilities in the nuclear weapons complex. As facilities age and less attention
is paid to their maintenance and upkeep, their condition will degrade. As key operating
personnel depart, knowledge of facility and weapons designs and contents will erode,
and safety will be reducedI3'.
DOE itself in an October 1998 report by that agency's Inspector General noted the precarious state of technical knowledge and expertise. This report acknowledged that DOE had not developed a coordinated or integrated program to preserve the knowledge base of a downsized
nuclear weapons complex. The report went on to show that while individual nuclear sites were
conducting archiving and knowledge capture activities, there was little consistency among
these sites in terms of planning, approach, and progress achieved. This situation, consequently,

stemmed from DOE's Office of Defense Programs not assigning programmatic responsibility
for developing and implementing a plan for knowledge preservation a ~ t i v i t i e s ' ~ ~ .
A consequence of not having a coordinated knowledge preservation approach in view of
retirements and downsizing at DOE nuclear facilities was also expressed in this report:
Without a coordinated, integrated program for knowledge preservation, the Department
risks not identifying and using all information that would provide continued high confidence in the nuclear stockpile. Specifically, the Department cannot ensure that all relevant information will be included in a comprehensive, well organized, and easily accessible knowledge base, and that priorities for the capture of data, information, and
knowledge, are appropriate and consistent throughout the nuclear weapons complex. In
addition, disparities in knowledge preservation planning, approach, and progress may
raise impediments to the integration of various site a ~ t i v i t i e s ' ~ ~ .
Concern over the future quality and viability of DOE's nuclear workers were not confined
to DNFSB or DOE. They extended to Congress as well, which authorized the creation of a
Commission on Maintaining United States Nuclear Weapons Expertise in the 1997 and 1998
National Defense Authorization
The Commission was charged with developing a
plan for recruiting and retaining requisite scientific, engineering, and technical personnel
within DOE's nuclear complex in order for DOE to maintain a safe, reliable, and long-term
nuclear weapons stockpile without underground nuclear testing. After a year of work, the
Commission issued its report to Congress and the Secretary of Energy on March 1, 1999'35.
The Commission's report contained many positive findings such as stable funding, the coherence of the Stockpile Stewardship Program intended to assure the safety and reliability of
U.S. nuclear weapons in the absence of testing, and the dedication and talent of the current
workforce at U.S. defense nuclear facilities. However, these attributes were weakened by numerous deficiencies including an aging workforce, a tight job market for requisite professional skills, and the absence of a long-term hiring plan'36.
Specific Commission findings reveal a workforce uncertain of its future in light of downsizing and a perception that nuclear weapons production is a declining industry, the demographic aging of a workforce with between one-third and one-half of the workforce at five facilities being between 45 and 65, engineering undergraduates not being knowledgeable about
DOE laboratories and production facilities, undergraduate enrollments in science and engineering declining by 19 percent since the peak year of 1983, frustration from DOE workplace micromanagement, and insufficient contractor flexibility in hiring and retaining qualified per~onnel'~'.
Three particularly salient commission findings stand out. One deals with defense nuclear
workforce concerns about the strength of the U.S. government's long-term commitment to
nuclear deterrence and stockpile stewardship, doubts about the continued existence of some
existing nuclear weapons complex facilities, and fear of fkrther personnel reductions in the
nuclear weapons workforce. A second point is the declining number of college students in
relevant science and engineering fields at a time when overall economic needs for these graduates are growing. A final noteworthy development is the significant percentage of international students in nuclear graduate programs, which complicates recruitment in a profession
requiring a security clearance and U.S. c i t i ~ e n s h i p ' ~ ~ .

Several recommendations were proposed by the Commission to rectify these shortcomings.
These included Congress and the administration reinforcing the national commitment and sense
of mission to the nuclear weapons complex of its vital role in national security; completing an integrated, long-term weapons stockpile life extension plan; strengthening the DOWDOE relationship to ensure enhanced budget and program coordination for national security needs; taking
immediate action to achieve greater DOE laboratory coordination; and expediting improvements
and the efficient use of the nuclear weapons production complex. Additional Commission recommendations included establishing clear authority lines within DOE, establishing and implementing a priority plan for replenishing crucial technical workforce needs, giving contractors
greater freedom in personnel matters, expanding training and career planning programs to accommodate a dramatically changed workforce environment, expanding the use of former nuclear weapons program employees, creating a permanent Defense Programs Advisory Committee within DOE, and enhancing congressional oversight of the nuclear weapons program'39.

11. Conclusion

The responsibilities of overseeing safety conditions at defense nuclear facilities and cleaning up environmental damage at these sites will remain a long-term commitment of DNFSB,
DOE, U.S. government environmental policy, and U.S. taxpayers. A 1996 DOE environmental issues analysis revealed that the final projected clean-up dates for the five most expensive
nuclear facility clean-up sites would be 2070 for Hanford, 2045 for the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, 2070 for Oak Ridge, 2055 for Rocky Flats, and 2050 for Savannah
River. Surveillance and monitoring activities at these facilities will continue beyond these
dates with these particular programs projected to conclude by 2070i40.
Besides its ongoing statutory responsibilities, DNFSB members and personnel will operate in a continually changing political and environmental policy cauldron. Protracted uncertainty over the status of the DOE-NRC external regulation pilot project and what this may
mean for the Board's future operations will remain on the radar screen of DNFSB personnel
for the foreseeable future.
Attempts to eliminate DOE have failed for now. However, the fact that such attempts were
made and attracted the support of numerous members of Congress illustrates that DOE'S political capital within the present Congress is not high. DNFSB appears to have sufficient
credibility in Congress to survive a now hypothetical termination of DOE. The Board's status and responsibilities in the event of this occurring, though, cannot be predicted.
Another event that could affect the DNFSB would be an accident at a defense nuclear facility
that threatens public safety outside the boundaries of the facility. A prompt and effective response
to such an incident could bolster DNFSB's credibility in public opinion even if such a catastrophic
occurrence was damaging to a DOE laboratory, the DOE, or other responsible political entities.
Conversely, the slightest public or governmental perception of an inept response to such an incident by the DNFSB, could produce fatal consequences to its institutional and political survival.
Significant changes in the international security environment will also affect DNFSB operations. In a five-year strategic plan released on September 30, 1997, the Board listed the
following two items as key assumptions:

1. Current U.S. national security policy affecting DOE nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship and management remains unchanged.
2. The administration maintains its moratorium on the underground testing of nuclear
weapons. Resumption of full-scale underground testing would require a major shift in
Board resources for oversightI4'.
Making and holding such assumptions during the middle of the Clinton administration is
probably a sign of political prudence. However, recent events such as the 1998 nuclear tests
conducted by India and Pakistan could weaken U.S. willingness to continue its nuclear weapons testing moratorium. In addition, concern over possible Chinese espionage at DOE laboratories has increased worries about the security of the United States' nuclear deterrent.
The Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) administered by DOE'S Los Alamos, Lawrence
Livermore, and Sandia laboratories provides ongoing maintenance and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. This program uses scientific advances in computer and experimental simulation
to assess U.S. nuclear weapons reliability without weapons testing'42.Despite Clinton administration support, this program's feasibility and reliability have been subjected to severe criticism.
A 1998 National Defense University and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory report
on the hture direction of U.S. nuclear policy was extremely critical of SSP. This document
noted that maintaining the safety, reliability, and performance of U.S. nuclear weapons without underground nuclear testing represented the highest risk of U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy, that U.S. nuclear weapons were not designed for indefinite stockpile life, and that no
program that could substitute for nuclear weapons testing prior to the United States 1992 test
moratorium decision. Additional criticisms of this report include SSP conclusions being
high-risk because they cannot be validated by nuclear testing, diminished nuclear stockpile
diversity due to nuclear disarmament treaties, concern over retaining personnel with technical expertise for weapons development and maintenance, the inability of the U.S. manufacturing complex to support serial nuclear weapons production, and the need for tritium production to sustain the nuclear weapons stockpile given tritium's limited half-life and the
restricted ability to recycle tritium from dismantled nuclear weapons143.
It is possible these and other potential national security concerns may lead the next presidential administration to resume nuclear testing. Such an event would have a significant impact on DNFSB operations requiring additional congressional appropriations and hiring
qualified personnel to execute the Board's newly expanded responsibilities.
An additional issue with which the DNFSB will have to contend is the matter of nuclear waste
repository siting. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act is due to be renewed in 1999 with Nevada's
Yucca Mountain appearing to be the prime candidate for the United States' permanent nuclear
waste repository. The need to resolve h s issue has been accelerated by an October 1998 federal
court decision holding DOE liable for radioactive waste storage costs at three closed New England nuclear power plants. Opposition to selecting Yucca Mountain has come from the Clinton
administration and Nevada's congressional delegation, led by Senator Hany Reid (D-NV)'44.
Such opposition to Yucca Mountain failed to stop the House Commerce Committee's 40-5
vote on April 21, 1999, to approve the shipment of nuclear waste to the Nevada Test Site by
June 30,2003. The Senate approved this legislation 64-34 on February 10,2000 and the House
approved it 252-167 on March 22, 2000. This legislation had not received presidential approval or veto at the end of April 2000'45.

Whatever happens in the decision over establishing a permanent nuclear waste repository
will involve DNFSB personnel in a significant way as they monitor the transportation, disposal, and storage of nuclear waste. It will also force the American public and its leaders to
face the reality that a safe and permanent disposal location for nuclear waste must be found
regardless of the emotional opposition such disposal will inevitably generate. The continuing
and ongoing involvement of the DNFSB in consulting with local leaders and communities in
affected areas can enhance public understanding of this issue and potentially alleviate uncertainty and concerns among the affected populations about possible health, safety, and environmental impacts of such di~posal'~'.
Board operations could also be improved by reducing the number of congressional committees to which they report. Depending on the issue(s) in question, DNFSB board members
must testify before the appropriations, armed services, and energy committees of the House
and Senate as well as other committees as circumstances may require. Assigning one congressional committee in each of these bodies to oversee DNFSB operations would reduce
congressional costs as well as DNFSB's cost and allow for more efficient oversight of Board
activities.
Public knowledge of DNFSB activities has been enhanced in several ways. The Board held
29 public meetings at or near defense nuclear facilities between 1990 and 1997 and an additional
29 public meetings in Washington, DC, during this period. It maintains a public reading room in
Washngton, DC, and bound volumes of public meeting transcripts between 1990 and 1997 generated nearly 7,000 pages of material and represent a portion of the approximately 1.75 million
pages of records made available for public viewing during this period'".
The agency's Website <http://www.dnfsb.gov/> is also a useful research source. It contains all of the Board's annual reports, recommendations, correspondence, technical issue reports, weekly reports on staff visits to affected defense nuclear facilities such as Hanford,
Oak Ridge, Pantex, Rocky Flats, and Savannah River, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
policies and procedures, and biographical information on Board members.
The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board was created in response to concern over the
safety of the United States' defense nuclear facilities. It has been relatively successful in fulfilling its responsibilities and maintaining a good relationship with both the DOE and Congress.
Uncertainty over possible future developments in national security, energy policy, environmental policy, and congressional attitudes toward DOE make predicting DNFSB's long-term future
uncertain. Nevertheless, it appears likely that the DNFSB or a comparable organization will be
a part of the U.S. government landscape for the foreseeable future given the long-term importance of ensuring safe operations at the United States' defense nuclear facilities.
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